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ABSTRACT
Historians of political culture and oratory in the early republic have long been 
fascinated by the role the public played in shaping the discourse of elected leaders, and 
have devoted much of their time to exploring how communication in both written and 
spoken form was used by politicians to improve their reputation in the public eye. 
Immersed in an age of advanced communication technology like television and the 
Internet that expose a politician’s every word and gesture to the scrutiny of millions of 
viewers around the nation, many scholars remain convinced that successful politicking in 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century meant appealing to a public audience 
through skillful use of the written and spoken word. While it is true that the public 
played a significant role in determining whether an elected leader succeeded or failed, 
this is far from the end of the story. Speech is a significantly different form of 
communication than print, a fact that translated into a distinct divide between the public 
and political audiences every speaker faced.
Massachusetts Federalist Fisher Ames was one o f the most well-respected 
political orators of his generation, a fact that has made him one of the most studied 
figures for scholars interested in the politics of language in the early republic. But 
previous analyses of Ames’s elocutionary gifts reflect the scholarly insistence that both 
the written and spoken word were primarily used to persuade a wide public audience. 
This thesis uses the perspective of Fisher Ames to investigate the divide between public 
discourse and political power that scholars have yet to fully explore. It argues that 
scholars have not paid adequate attention to the important divide between speech and 
print, nor have they analyzed the relationship between members of the public “outer” 
audience, who observed from the galleries and read the newspapers that covered political 
proceedings, and members of the “inner audience” of a politician’s colleagues, who 
witnessed every speech in its original form and spectacle, and who alone would decide 
the persuasiveness of his oration with their vote.
THE INNER AUDIENCE
2INTRODUCTION
On April 28, 1796, Fisher Ames, Federalist Representative from Massachusetts, 
rose to address his colleagues in the House for the first time in months After falling ill 
the previous autumn with the sickness that would eventually take his life, Ames had spent 
the previous few months corresponding with friends and colleagues from his Dedham, 
Massachusetts home and listening silently to the House debates. Not accustomed to 
playing the role of passive listener as his colleagues debated, Ames grew restless. “It is a 
new post for me to be in,” he complained. He felt useless, “thrown into the wagon, as 
part of the baggage. I am like an old gun, that is spiked, or the trunnions knocked off, 
and yet am carted off, not for the worth of the old iron, but to balk the enemy of a 
trophy.” Ames had been in the House for seven years, and understood well the 
importance of eloquent speaking. Though he had returned to the assembly, his doctor 
warned that he was still not healthy enough to engage in debate. Without the ability to 
participate in the debates, Ames considered himself politically dead. The treaty brokered 
by John Jay after British seizure of American merchant ships in 1794 had been before 
Congress since July, 1795. Since that time, Ames had witnessed partisan posturing, long- 
winded speeches, and public violence in response to a treaty many believed to be 
lackluster at best. The “sophisms and rant” of his colleagues seemed to Ames a poor use 
of the House’s time, and clear evidence that few in the House had carefully read Jay’s
3Treaty and reflected upon its merits.1 It was imperative that he marshal enough strength 
to speak in defense of a document that seemed to have only detractors. Finally, on April 
28, Ames stood before the assembly, and prepared to give the speech that would come to 
define him as the House’s most moving and eloquent orator.2
Ames’ s speech in support of the Jay Treaty has long served scholars as a means of 
examining language and communication in the early republic. Celebrated as one of the 
most remarkable speeches in all o f American history, it has been used by many scholars 
as evidence of its author’s elocutionary talent, and as a reminder of a time, long before 
the canned speeches and poll-driven, predictable, and stale rhetoric of today’s political 
leaders, when the spoken word had the power to change minds and move hearts.
1 Ames to Thomas Dwight, March 9, 1796, in W.B. Allen, ed., Works o f Fisher 
Ames as Published by Seth Ames, 2 vols. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1983), hereafter 
cited as Works o f Ames, II: 1136; Jerald A. Combs, The Jay Treaty: Political 
Battleground o f the Founding Fathers (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), 
120-121, 135; Annals o f Congress, 3rd Congress, 1st Session, (March 25, 1794), 529.
2 For discussion of Ames’s reputation as a speaker and political leader, see 
Winfred E.A. Bernhard, Fisher Ames: Federalist and Statesman, 1758-1808 (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1965); J.T. Kirkland’s essay (1809) in Works o f 
Ames I: xliii-liii; Elisha Douglass, “Fisher Ames, Spokesman for New England 
Federalism,” Proceedings o f the American Philosophical Society 103 (1959), 713; and 
John W. Malsberger, “The Political Thought of Fi sher Ames,” Journal o f the Early 
Republic 2 (1982), 1-20. For analyses of his Jay Treaty Speech and its role in shaping 
his political legacy, see Sandra M. Gustafson, Eloquence is Power: Oratory and 
Performance in Early America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 
235-46; Anthony Hillbruner, “Fisher Ames,” in Bernard K. Duffy and Halford R. Ryan, 
eds., American Orators Before 1900: Critical Studies and Sources (New York: 
Greenwood Press, 1987), 25; James M. Farrell, “Fisher Ames and Political Judgment: 
Reason, Passion, and Vehement Style in the Jay Treaty Speech,” Quarterly Journal o f  
Speech 16, no. 4 (November 1990), 416-34; Samuel Eliot Morison, “Squire Ames and 
Doctor Ames,” New England Quarterly, vol. 1 (1928), 6; Todd Estes, “‘The Most 
Bewitching Piece of Parliamentary Oratory’: Fisher Ames’s Jay Treaty Speech 
Reconsidered,” Historical Journal o f Massachusetts 28, no. 1, (Winter, 2000), 1-22; Beth 
Innocenti Manolescu, “Style and Spectator Judgment in Fisher Ames’s Jay Treaty 
Speech,” Quarterly Journal o f Speech 84, no. 1, (February, 1998), 62-79.
4Studies of Ames and his famous speech are part of a broader scholarly effort to 
understand the public dimensions of political discourse. Drawing predominantly or 
entirely upon analysis o f printed materials, many scholars of the early republic have 
argued that the written word constituted the strongest link between political leaders and 
the watchful American public audience, and that communicating effectively meant 
understanding and skillfully manipulating it to a politician’s advantage. Joanne B. 
Freeman’s Affairs o f Honor: National Politics in the New Republic describes the political 
uses of pamphlets, broadsides, newspapers, and other forms of written communication to 
illuminate the complex honor code that shaped the communication and decision making 
of the 1790s. Key to a politician’s success, she argues, was a strong public reputation, 
which politicians established through keen understanding of the realities of 
communication and their ability to play their role within the “theater of national politics.” 
“National politicians were no isolated elite, politicking in a bubble of ideology and high 
ideals,” she writes.
For reasons both personal and political, they were accountable to a public with 
enormous power over their reputations and careers.. .Different national politicians 
may have attempted to suppress, stifle, or influence this public in different ways, 
but as a constant and judgmental audience in a culture of reputation, the public 
had a prevailing power of its own. This mutual push and pull is the dynamic of 
republican politics.3
Affairs o f Honor is but one of many recent studies that examine the politics of 
communication and explore the value of the printed and written word as a connection 
between political leaders and the people they represented.4 These studies have
3 Freeman, Affairs o f Honor: National Politics in the New Republic (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2001), 59-60.
4 See Michael Warner’s Letters o f the Republic: Publication and the Public
5persuasively illustrated how printed media, especially newspapers, the most commonly 
read and widely distributed type of publication, extended the discourse of national 
politics into the broader audience of the American public. Recent analyses of political 
oratory have suggested that eloquent political speakers like Ames aspired to a similar 
goal, but did so through passionate performance. “Congressmen from all parts of the 
country used congressional speech for public communication, and their remarks were 
frequently addressed more directly to their constituents than their colleagues,” Noble 
Cunningham insists, and scholars contend that no speaker in the early republic 
exemplified this technique better than Ames. “[T]he wiliest demagogue in the House,” as 
Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick dubbed him in The Age o f Federalism, “possessed a 
physical beauty, grace, and poise that enhanced his appeal for the visitors in the House 
gallery,” Sandra M. Gustafson claims, and a “style o f deliberative oratory” that was 
characterized by “a form o f representative speech intended to clarify and enlarge the 
popular voice.” His Jay Treaty speech was deemed eloquent, James M. Farrell contends, 
because its author was able to craft an emotional speech that successfully compelled his
Sphere in Eighteenth-Century America (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990); 
and his “The Public Sphere and the Cultural Mediation of Print,” in William Solomon 
and Robert McChesney, eds., Ruthless Criticism: New Perspectives in US. 
Communication History (Minneapolis: University o f Minnesota Press, 1993), 7-37; John 
Howe, Language and Political M eaning in Revolutionary America (Amherst: University 
of Massachusetts Press, 2004); Jeffrey L. Pasley, ‘The Tyranny o f Printers Newspaper 
Politics in the Early American Republic (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 
2001); and Christopher Grasso, A Speaking Aristocracy: Transforming Public Discourse 
in Eighteenth-Century Connecticut (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1999). For a more in-depth discussion of politics and the public sphere, see Jurgen 
Habermas, The Structural Transformation o f the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a 
Category o f Bourgeois Society, trans. Thomas Burger and Frederick Lawrence 
(Cambridge: MIT University Press, 1989).
6listeners in the assembly as well as in the House gallery “to recognize the influence of 
passion and act on the basis of their feelings.”5
These studies correctly point out that communication between members of 
Congress and the general populace was, then as now, often a two-way street. Members 
of the public were the authors of personal letters and petitions Congress and its members 
constantly received. They watched from the galleries and loitered in taverns. They were 
the publishers and the readers of the newspapers that chronicled and criticized the words 
and deeds of national politicians on a daily basis for the entire nation to see. 
Congressmen, of course, were the speakers elected to advocate on behalf of their 
constituents. Their speeches would often be printed and distributed in newspapers and 
pamphlets across the country. They were the authors of letters, directed both privately to 
individual citizens and publicly to their entire constituency. Each time a congressman 
rose to voice his opinion, he spoke fully aware of the public audiences outside the 
political realm, who observed the discourse of national politics in print and from the 
galleries. The role public exposure played in determining a politician’s reputation was 
something he could ill afford to underestimate.
But though intimately intertwined, speech and print are distinct in ways that play 
a significant role in determining how large an audience a politician’s words could reach. 
Speech, after all, incorporates not only words but bodily motion and voice tone that 
appeal to the audiences’ emotions but cannot be conveyed through print. By insisting
5 Cunningham, ed., Circular Letters o f Congressmen to Their Constituents, 1789- 
1829 (Chapel Hill: University o f North Carolina Press, 1978), 3 vols., I: xxviii; 
Gustafson, Eloquence is Power, 235-36; Farrell, “Fisher Ames and Political Judgment,” 
421; Elkins and McKitrick, The Age o f Federalism: The Early American Republic, 1788- 
1800 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 448. See also Hillbruner, “Fisher 
Ames,” 25.
7that speech, like print, served as a means of addressing and persuading a wider public 
audience, scholars have obscured the role that oratory played as a means of 
communicating within the realm of national politics. This has also lead to some 
confusion regarding analysis of Ames’s seminal speech and his legacy as a political 
orator. As the standard-bearer of arch-conservative Federalism, Ames articulated a 
strong distrust of the public, ubiquitous in his speeches and writings, which seem to 
contradict scholarly arguments that Ames’s Jay Treaty speech exemplified the eloquence 
of a statesman who targeted a public audience with a performance designed to captivate 
the heart and seduce the emotions. This contradiction has not escaped the attention of 
scholars, and has proven to be one of the most frustrating aspects of Ames’s speech, 
leading some to conclude that the contradiction cannot be explained. “[W]hy did Fisher 
Ames, long suspicious of the influence of passion in politics, faced with the most vital 
foreign policy question of his age, suddenly advocate that the Jay Treaty ought to be 
determined by feelings?” Farrell asks. “We will never know for certain.”6
This essay explores the divide that existed between the closely linked but distinct 
worlds of speech and print, and examines the extent to which speech shaped how national 
politicians communicated with one another, rather than the public at large. It argues that 
while political leaders relied on printed sources, especially newspapers, as the ideal 
means of reaching a large public audience, within the assembly, the debating and 
decision making of national politics took place in a form and spectacle that could not be 
translated to the written or printed page. Speakers were judged as much by the 
performance they gave as by the position they advocated, their colleagues evaluating
6 Farrell, “Fisher Ames and Political Judgment,” 431.
every facet of their oration based on an intimate familiarity with their political ideologies 
and elocutionary styles that was bred out of constant interaction and observance of one 
another in both public orations and private discussion—a familiarity that text could not 
capture and even visitors in the gallery could not share. When a national leader rose to 
speak, he knew that his most important and most demanding audience would not be the 
audience of public outsiders who listened from the gallery and followed the debates in 
print, but the inner audience of his colleagues before him. Exploring how politicians 
understood the relationship between the different audiences they faced, examining the 
role speech played as the primary means of communication within the assembly, and 
investigating how this unique role shaped the discourse of elected leaders are important 
endeavors that scholars have yet to fully undertake.
But because of the nature of the differences between the spoken and the written 
word, taking on these important tasks is admittedly difficult. Scholars rely upon the 
durability of text to preserve the words speakers used to articulate their ideas and grant 
future generations access to the ethereal world of oratory, a world comprised not merely 
of words but of elocutionary intangibles like gesture, inflection, and body language. It is 
little wonder that studies of the political uses of speech have come to dovetail so much 
with studies of print. To explore the divide between these two forms o f communication, 
and the multiple audiences every speaker had to contend with, therefore, we must look 
beyond simply what a speaker said to what those who heard him observed. In the 
absence of modern technologies like recording devices, television cameras, and the 
Internet, we must examine not merely the speeches politicians gave but what their
9colleagues said about them, and how this differs from what public audiences could see 
and hear.
Fisher Ames was not only the author o f one of the most studied and celebrated 
orations in American history; he was also a keen observer of the political world around 
him. Serving in the House of Representatives for his entire tenure in national politics, 
Ames recorded his observations not only about the ideas championed by his colleagues, 
but how those ideas were expressed by various speakers and received within the 
assembly. His letters, speeches, and essays grant us a unique and valuable perspective 
through which current scholarly assertions about how leaders communicated within the 
realm of national politics can be tested, and his seminal speech can be reassessed. For if 
any truth exists in the current scholarly assertions that speech, like print, was primarily 
used to by political leaders to reach a broad public audience, surely it would be apparent 
in a study of one of the most gifted speakers o f his generation, speaking in a publicly- 
elected and publicly-accessible legislative body. If we are to gain a more complete 
understanding of the political realm o f the early republic and the divide between the 
public and political audiences every leader faced, the perspective of Fisher Ames seems a 
natural place to begin.
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CHAPTER 1
POLITICAL DISCOURSE AND PUBLIC PERCEPTION 
On Thursday, April 30, 1789, the newly-inaugurated President Washington took 
his oath of office from the balcony of Federal Hall in New York City, and gave his first 
presidential address to a joint session o f the two houses of Congress. For Fisher Ames 
and his colleagues, it was the first chance to see the champion of the Revolution and the 
Commander-in-Chief speak as the leader of the United States. Washington’s first 
inaugural was elegantly crafted and his words were carefully chosen. Printed in 
pamphlets and newspapers throughout the country, it seemed to Ames destined to be an 
immediate classic to the people o f the new nation. Ames wrote to George Richards 
Minot that he “sat entranced” as Washington spoke. “It seemed to me an allegory in 
which virtue was personified, and addressing those whom she would make her votaries. 
Her power over the heart was never greater, and the illustration of her doctrine by her 
own example was never more perfect.”7
Washington’s performance, however, left much to be desired. He seemed 
nervous, speaking softly at times, so much so that listeners had to strain to hear him. He 
looked old and battle-weary, Ames thought, remarking that “time has played havoc upon 
his face.”8 Others with a close view of Washington the orator made similar critiques.
7 Ames to George Richards Minot, May 3, 1789, in Works o f Ames, I: 567-68.
8 Ibid.
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Pennsylvania Senator William Maclay noted that Washington “trembled” nervously 
when he spoke, his voice low and soft. “He put part of the fingers of his left hand into 
the side of what I think the tailors call the fall o f the breeches, changing the paper into his 
left [right] hand,” Maclay wrote. “After some time he then did the same with some of the 
fingers of his right hand. When he came to the words all the world, he made a flourish 
with his right hand, which left rather an ungainly impression.”9
Ames carefully considered the political lesson illustrated by the president’s 
speech. Washington’s speech clearly worked, if only because it was Washington 
delivering it. The sheer force of the president’s considerable reputation made it 
captivating, even to observers like Ames who viewed the speech close enough to note its 
flaws. But even without that, Washington’s words would certainly move the public 
audience who would read it as printed text, and its eloquent composition could 
conceivably make the speech even more memorable and moving as a document, devoid 
of its author’s soft voice, aging face and awkward gestures. Ames enclosed with his 
letter a copy of one o f his own speeches that had been recently published by John Fenno, 
editor of the Federalist Gazette o f the United States. Feeling that the speech was “not 
flattered by the publication,” Ames suggested that he (Ames) have it republished in 
Boston, perhaps anonymously, after retouching it to make its prose more appealing to the 
eye. Discrepancies between the two drafts would be blamed on newspapers and their 
routine practice of “[taking] the debates from shorthand writers.” “I submit it to your 
friendship,” Ames wrote, “to judge whether it will tend to create invidious observations
9 William Maclay, April 30, 1789 in Edgar S. Maclay, ed., The Journal o f William 
M aclay: United States Senator From Pennsylvania, 1789-1791 (New York: D. Appleton 
and Company, 1890) hereafter cited as M aclay’s Journal, 9.
12
against me, or be a prudent thing.”10
In the last two decades of the eighteenth century, newspapers were but one of 
many types of printed materials that had proliferated across the young nation. They 
joined pamphlets, publicly-addressed letters, broadsides and more to weave an intricate 
web of gossip, news, and political advocacy that many believed unified the nation 
through the exchange o f ideas. Newspapers, however, proved to be a particularly 
effective means of bridging the gap between politicians and their constituents. Spread 
throughout the nation and constantly growing, the network of gazettes, journals, and 
advertisers that dotted the landscape of the young nation in the 1790s provided a format 
for many forms of political correspondence, particularly accounts of congressional 
debates and the speeches of representatives, and targeted the widest public audience of all 
forms of print. Casting such a wide net over the increasingly literate American public, 
the press distributed the words of elected leaders to all comers of the country, and 
politicians who aspired to eloquence quickly learned that they could ill-afford to ignore 
its presence.11
“Modem political oratory” was a spectacle “chiefly performed by the Pen and the
10 Ames to George Richards Minot, May 3, 1789 in Works o f Ames, I: 568; Elkins 
and McKitrick, The Age o f Federalism, 282-84.
11 For information about the number of newspapers in circulation in the 1780s and 
1790s, as well as analysis of the impact of other types of printed communication, see 
Richard R. John, Spreading the News: The American Postal System from  Franklin to 
Morse (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995); and Pasley, “The Tyranny o f 
Printers. ” For data on the proliferation of newspapers in these decades, see Simon P. 
Newman, Parades and the Politics o f the Street: Festive Culture in the Early American 
Republic (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997), 3. According to 
Kenneth Lockridge, by 1790, almost 90 percent of males in New England could read.
See Lockridge, Literacy in Colonial New England: An Enquiry into the Social Context o f 
Literacy in the Early Modern West (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1974), 18-21.
13
Press,” proclaimed printer and politician Benjamin Franklin, and many of his 
contemporaries agreed. The intertwined nature of the printed and spoken word was 
hailed by many as the catalyst of a more “civic” political discourse that took place not 
only in the assemblies o f elite political leaders, but also among members of the literate 
public in salons, coffeehouses, and in the street. Newspapers in particular were widely 
celebrated for widening the scope of political participation, promoting what James 
Madison called a “free intercourse of sentiments” that unified the nation. They were a 
“channel of information,” one French observer noted, functioning simultaneously as a 
means for politicians to correspond with the public back home and as a window through 
which the nation could view the debates and proceedings of their elected representatives. 
Moreover, others remarked, their wide-reaching circulation ensured exposure of political 
corruption and deceit. Serving before the Senate opened its doors to the public, William 
Maclay simultaneously praised the press and criticized his colleagues when he noted that 
some of them “would have been ashamed to have seen their speeches of this day, 
reflected in the newspapers o f to-morrow.”12
But for Fisher Ames, these facts made the press’s political power even more 
suspect and potentially dangerous. Throughout his tenure in the House of 
Representatives, Ames held a deep-seated suspicion o f the public, a suspicion he 
repeatedly articulated in his letters, essays, and speeches. “The power of the people, if 
uncontroverted, is licentious and mobbish,” he believed. Devoid of “nine-tenths of the
12 Leonard W. Labaree, Whitfield J. Bell, Jr., et al., eds., The Papers o f Benjamin 
Franklin, 24 vols. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), III: 413; Freeman, Affairs 
o f Honor, 123-26; Pasley, “The Tyranny o f the Printers, ” 105; Cornell, The Other 
Founders, 248-49; January 17, 1791, in M aclay’s Journal, 371.
14
good sense there is,” the public was a mixture of “[t]he credulous [who] will believe the 
worst story because it is the most wonderful, and the lazy and the busy [who] will agree 
in admitting the first that reaches them because they will not, perhaps cannot, sift the 
circumstance of any.” A government that appealed to the public was “a government by 
force without discipline. It is led by demagogues who are soon supplanted by bolder and 
abler rivals, and soon the whole power is in the hands o f our favorite, the boldest and 
most violent.” It was “a military government in the embryo.”13
A distinct divide existed between national politicians and the public they 
represented, despite the connection print, especially newspapers, provided. For Ames, 
this was as it should be. Newspapers played an important role as the bridge between the 
two, and their writers and editors therefore had an obligation to maintain the integrity of 
this bridge by broadcasting the discourse o f elected leaders accurately and unencumbered 
by emotional or politically biased writing. There existed far more to the discourse and 
decision making of national politics than what the public could observe, and because 
members of the public based so much of their assessment o f the issues at hand and the 
men who represented them on what they read in print, it was crucial that the press use its 
power responsibly, if only to keep the “licentious and mobbish” subdued and the 
“credulous, the lazy and the busy” content. But for Ames, newspaper writers were 
straying dangerously far from this goal. Contrary to their purpose, the press was wresting 
control over political matters from the hands of America’s elected leaders by exerting its 
own influence over the emotional and easily-led public through sensationalized writing
13 Ames to Oliver Wolcott, Jr., quoted in Malsberger, “The Political Thought of 
Fisher Ames,” 6; Ames; Ames, [Untitled], (1794?), in Works o f Ames, II: 977-78.
15
and blatant inaccuracies. “The newspapers greatly influence public opinion,” he 
lamented, “and that controls everything else.” 14 They have “[supplied] an endless 
stimulus to their imagination and passions...rendering] their temper and habits infinitely 
worse,” and have “inspired ignorance with presumption, so that those who cannot be 
governed by reason are no longer to be awed by authority.”15
While few fellow national leaders articulated their suspicions of the public with 
the same level o f cynicism, the belief that members o f the public were more erratic and 
emotional than their more educated and refined representatives, and were therefore 
vulnerable to emotional manipulation by crafty and unscrupulous politicians and 
publishers, was widely held. Words like “democracy,” and “enthusiasm” that today call 
to mind principles of social equality and the freedoms afforded people through self-rule, 
and genuine interest or excitement for a subject or cause, were often used by elite leaders 
across lines o f political ideology to connote the disintegration of “civilized” society 
through rejection of traditional social order and an embrace of the unguided passions. 
“[T]he evils we experience flow from the excess of democracy,” Republican Elbridge 
Gerry remarked during the Constitutional Convention. “The people do not want virtue, 
but are the dupes of pretend patriots.” Federalist John Adams lamented in the early 
1790s that the pro-French sentiment sweeping the nation had made the public “so 
blind.. .and enthusiastic o f everything,” and his son, Thomas Boylston Adams, observed 
to his brother John Quincy that “[t]he Athenians doubtless afford an excellent example of
14 Ames to Jeremiah Smith, December 14, 1802, in Works o f Ames, II: 1450.
15 Ames, “The Dangers o f American Liberty,” (1805) in Works o f Ames, I: 134. 
See also “Review of a Pamphlet on the State of the British Constitution,” (1807?), in 
Works o f Ames, I: 183-86.
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the violence to which a Democratic government necessarily leads people.”16 They too 
were well-aware of the power of the press to shape public perception, and shared Ames’s 
opinion that writers and editors carelessly printed whatever they wished, distorting the 
words of political leaders to fit space constraints and political agendas in the process. 
George Washington filmed that “the gazettes” were -charged, and some o f them 
indecently communicative of charges that need evidence for their support.” Thomas 
Jefferson became so incensed with the “putrid state,” of the press and “the malignity, the 
vulgarity, and mendacious spirit of those who write for them” that he concluded “[a]s 
vehicles of information, and a curb on our functionaries, they have rendered themselves 
useless, by forfeiting all title to belief.” James Madison accused an editor of 
“mutilation,” “perversion,” and even “illiteracy” when he suspected a paper of slanted 
coverage of House proceedings.17
16 Gerry quoted in James Madison, Notes o f Debates on the Federal Convention 
o f1787, Adrienne Koch, ed. (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1966), 39; John Adams 
quoted in James Morton Smith, ed., The Republic o f Letters: The Correspondence 
Between Jefferson and Madison, 1776-1826, 3 vols. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995) II: 
746; Thomas Boylston Adams quoted in Linda K. Kerber, Federalists in Dissent: 
Imagery and Ideology in Jeffersonian America (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970), 
177. For more discussion of Republican distrust of the public, see Saul Cornell, The 
Other Founders: Anti-Federalism & the Dissenting Tradition in America, 1788-1828 
(Chapel Hill: University o f North Carolina Press, 1999), and “The Address and Reasons 
of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of Pennsylvania to their Constituents,” 
(December 18, 1787) in Pennsylvania Packet and Daily Advertiser, in Herbert J. Storing, 
ed., The Complete Anti-Federalist, 1 vols. (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1981) 
III: 145-66. For discussion of the Federalist view, see Kerber, Federalists in Dissent, 
esp. chap. 6; and Woody Holton, “‘Divid et Impera’: Federalist 10 in a Wider Sphere,” 
William and M ary Quarterly, 3rd Series, LXII, no. 2, (April 2005), 175-211.
17 Washington to Gouvemor Morris, June 21, 1792, in Dorothy Twohig, ed., The 
Papers o f George Washington, 12 vols. (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 
1987-2002), X: 491; Thomas Jefferson to Walter Jones, January 2, 1814, in Merrill D. 
Peterson, ed., Thomas Jefferson: Writings, (New York: Literary Classics o f the U.S., 
1984), 1317; James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, May 9, 1789 in Charles F. Hobson,
In a political realm that revolved around reputation, few things angered national 
leaders more than public criticism based on false or incomplete information, and few 
things worried them more than the press’s power to control what information reached the 
public. Fearing that readers would have no choice but to accept what was printed at face 
value, politicians fretted and complained constantly about the frequency and the ease 
with which their words were distorted in print. Printers wielded complete discretion over 
what was published and what was cut; they decided if and how the contents of a speech, 
essay, or report on political proceedings would be edited or changed. Each omission of a 
word, each paraphrase of an idea, drove a deeper and potentially more damning wedge 
between what an elected leader actually said and what the public perceived. Through the 
late 1780s and 1790s, many politicians responded to this by turning their attention 
inward, distributing important documents and correspondences only to a very limited 
group of fellow politicians, rather than risk the distortions of press publication.
“Neglect [ing] the cultivation of popular favour,” as Alexander Hamilton called it, carried 
risks of its own, as it made one a target for accusations of aristocratic elitism and charges 
that one wished to supercede the authority of the public will by not exposing one’s ideas 
to public scrutiny. But the embarrassment one suffered from such indictments by his 
peers, many felt, paled in comparison to the potentially devastating consequences of 
public ridicule.18
Robert A. Rutland, et al., eds., The Papers o f James Madison, 22 vols., (Chicago and 
Charlottesville: The University o f Chicago Press and the University Press of Virginia, 
1962-1993), hereafter cited as James Madison Papers, XII: 142. See also Thomas 
Jefferson, “Anas,” (excerpt), in James Madison Papers, XIV: 56-57.
18 Saul Cornell describes one instance in 1787 when Virginia Anti-Federalists 
George Mason and Richard Henry Lee distributed important political essays and letters
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Try though they might, though, national leaders could never keep their words 
completely out of the public eye. Even if they kept their letters and private documents 
well-guarded and out o f the hands of editors and political opponents, newspaper coverage 
of political proceedings and publication of congressional speeches ensured that a 
politician could escape public scrutiny only if  he never said a word in the assembly— 
which no politician could afford to do. It seemed that if public opinion were truly 
paramount to the discourse of national politics, than the press, not the representatives in 
the assembly, truly had the last word.
Ames wrote and spoke comparatively little about the press in his essays, letters 
and speeches, but his letter to Minot describing George Washington’s first inaugural 
address does support the contention that political speech and print were intimately linked. 
It illustrates how the relationship between the two played a role in shaping what 
politicians said, and what they hoped their words would accomplish in the public sphere. 
But his letter also reveals important details about the difference between the public and 
political audiences with which every speaker had to contend, and the different roles 
speech and print played in the realm o f national politics. It offers a glimpse at the distinct 
divide that existed between what went on in the discourse o f national politics and what 
the press reported, a divide that was both the root o f politicians’ fears about the power of 
the press, and what made it possible for political leaders to deal with competing (and
about the Constitution to selected men within their political network, rather than to the 
general public through newspapers. Their action immediately drew venom from 
Federalist Tobias Lear, who argued that their technique was underhanded and a blatant 
attempt to “[hand] forth” their opinions “without submitting [them] to the test of public 
investigation.” Cornell, The Other Founders, 74-76; Hamilton to James A. Bayard, April 
16-21, 1802, in Harold C. Syrett, et al, eds., The Papers o f Alexander Hamilton, 27 vols., 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1961-1987), XXV: 606.
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often conflicting) public and political audiences. Elected leaders understood that the 
“national public audience” who read a speaker’s oration in the newspapers or observed 
the discourse from the gallery was, at best, a second-hand participant in the discussion. 
This distinct separation was what gave the press its power, for without access to the 
private conversations, confidential correspondences, and the daily performances of 
assembly members, the public had no choice but to view the discourse of their elected 
leaders through the distorted and incomplete lens of the press. This meant that a 
politician could rarely undo the damage lies, distortions, or “unflattering” printed 
speeches could do to his reputation once published for all the nation to see But 
politically savvy speakers like Ames knew that writers and editors were not the only ones 
who could take advantage of the malleable nature of the printed word. The politician 
was, after all, the author of the speech, and through creative editing or alteration of his 
own, he could offer his own “version” of the original that could at least minimize the 
political repercussions the newspaper’s modifications may have caused, and perhaps, if 
he was fortunate, give himself a second chance at eloquence.
But a second chance, Ames’s letter also suggests, was all it could ever be. 
Communicating effectively in the realm of national politics involved an understanding of 
the different audiences political speakers faced, and the different criteria by which these 
different audiences judged him. Unlike the general public, the inner audience of a 
colleague’s peers experienced his performance first, and convincing them required far 
more than polished prose. Before them, the fate o f every speech, even if the author was 
the universally revered and admired President George Washington, hinged not only on 
his command of his words but also his command of the room. The role the performative
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aspects of speech played in shaping a politician’s reputation among his peers was so 
profound that even Ames, who admitted he was “entranced” by Washington’s presence, 
could not ignore the President’s sub par performance and the extent to which it detracted 
from its power and effectiveness before Congress.
This is not to suggest that print was important only as a means for leaders to 
conceal from public view the elocutionary foibles that were in plain view for their 
colleagues. Members of the House of Representatives relied on print to help them keep 
their constituents abreast of the latest political developments and to convey what they 
were doing to advocate on their behalf. In addition to speeches before the assembly, 
House members also published essays addressing specific political issues and wrote open 
letters to be published in newspapers their constituents were likely to read. But elected 
leaders quickly learned that the importance of performance was an inescapable reality of 
national politics, as advocating on behalf of one’s constituents in the assembly involved a 
mastery of elocutionary skills that could not be conveyed through print and would likely 
not be seen by the public. Politicians quickly discovered that the charge o f everyday 
governance was a very different task than keeping their constituents back home up-to- 
date on political developments. Indeed, corresponding with members of the public was 
very time-consuming, and tailoring speeches to address constituents was a laborious task 
whose benefits depended on what the “shorthand writers” in the gallery could take down 
and what newspaper editors chose to print. Both, savvy politicians concluded, detracted 
from their primary responsibility o f representing their constituents in the assembly far 
more than they helped any political cause. Theodoras Bailey of New York thought it 
necessary to write frequent letters to be published in local newspapers, but he conceded
that doing so only disseminated “information.. .generally” to the people he represented. 
When Francis Preston of Virginia wrote letters to his constituents in 1794, he admitted 
that his “intention when [he] came to this place” was to give his constituents “all the 
information in his power, and at as early a period as possible, on those subjects which 
effect their interest.” He soon found, however, that his “acquaintances within the 
district” were “so numerous, that it would be a laborious task to write them all, and would 
divert my attention too much from the business I am sent here on.”19
In short, print was the preferred method of reaching the national public audience 
outside the halls o f the assembly, but politicians were forced to concede that the link it 
provided between elected leaders and those they represented was often tenuous, distorted, 
and as potentially dangerous to their reputation as it could be beneficial. While 
politicians like Ames devised various ways to deal with the challenges and frustrations of 
print, they also turned their attention inward, to an environment within the walls of the 
assembly that posed unique challenges of its own.
Just eight days after reaching a quorum, the House introduced one of the most 
unique and formidable challenges with which its members would have to contend: a 
gallery o f public visitors. “All ranks & degrees of men seemed to be actuated by one 
common impulse, to fill the galleries.. . & to gaze on one of the most interesting fruits of 
their struggle, a popular assembly summoned from all parts of the United States,” James 
Kent, an early onlooker of the House’s public opening in 1789, observed in 1832. “I was 
looking upon an organ of popular will, just beginning to breathe the Breath of Life &
19 Cunningham, Circular Letters, I: 17, 20-21.
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which might in some future age, much more truly than the Roman Senate, be regarded as 
‘the refuge of nations.” ’20
Neither the Senate nor the executive or judicial branches were subject to the daily 
scrutiny House members faced from the visitors in the gallery. Their presence made 
them an audience distinct from the rest of the public who had only print to rely upon. It 
was impossible for politicians to anticipate who would be in the gallery, as it changed 
every day. But despite this, the public audience could not simply be ignored. Visitors in 
attendance were a visible, audible, tangible reality, many of whom were not simply 
nonbiased spectators who were there to observe, but were interested citizens who likely 
hailed from the city in which Congress convened or a nearby town or community, and 
who took advantage of their close proximity to the national political community to 
actively keep up with political developments. While observing the proceedings, visitors 
in the gallery moved about, chatted with each other (in whispers, if the speaker was 
lucky), and interrupted proceedings with petitions and other correspondences to their 
elected leaders. Some groups were particularly bold, not limiting their presence to the 
proceedings inside the congressional walls. When presenting a petition to the House to 
abolish slavery in 1790, a group of eleven Quakers from Philadelphia intruded on 
representatives outside the House, writing letters to House members and confronting 
them on the street. Inside, they made their presence felt as well, as Jeffrey L. Pasley
20 James Kent to Elizabeth Hamilton, Dec. 2, 1832, in Charlene Bangs Bickford, 
‘“ Public Attention is Very Much Fixed on the Proceedings of the New Congress’: The 
First Federal Congress Organizes Itself,” in Kenneth R. Bowling and Donald R. Kennon, 
eds., Inventing Congress: Origins and Establishment o f the First Federal Congress 
(Athens: Ohio University Press, 1999), 148; Andrew W. Robertson, The Language o f 
Democracy: Political Rhetoric in the United States and Britain, 1790-1900 (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1995), 11-15; Gustafson, Eloquence is Power, 234-35.
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describes it, “looming over the proceedings like the specters of a guilty national 
conscience.”21
The active presence of public citizens made impressing the galleries a tall and 
important task, one that required each man to make difficult decisions about how he 
crafted his orations he did not have to think about when considering the public outside 
the House chamber. Should he include the public in his oration by making eye contact 
with visitors as he spoke, or should he confine his gaze to his colleagues to avoid the 
impression that he was playing to the crowd? Should he employ broad, sweeping 
gestures, or should he be more reserved? Should he speak loudly and forcibly, to convey 
a sense of power and authority, or should he express a deliberate, rational disposition 
with a softer tone?
Perhaps the most important decision a speaker had to make was to decide how 
long his speech should last. Brevity had the advantage of being succinct, but a speech 
devoid of any ornamentation would likely not impress one’s listeners; garrulousness 
increased the likelihood that at least a passage or two from his speech would survive the 
editorial chopping block and the selective memory of gallery members who may or may 
not ever hear him speak again, but ran the risk of boring listeners with superfluous filler. 
While some members like Elbridge Gerry resolved to “be a spectator,” speaking only 
after he had acquired more knowledge o f his colleagues and the issue at hand, many 
others considered cautious silence political suicide. It was imperative to every man’s
21 For a general description of petitioning the early Congress, see Jeffrey L. 
Pasley, “Democracy, Gentility, and Lobbying in the Early U. S. Congress,” in Julian E. 
Zelizer, ed., The American Congress: The Building o f Democracy (New York: Houghton 
Mifflin, 2004), 38-62, quote p. 49; James Sterling Young, The Washington Community, 
1800-1828 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966).
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political reputation that he make it clear to the public that he was involved in the 
discussion and not merely taking up space. He must “make a speech,” as William Eustis 
put it in 1794, “if it is about the black art, or cock fighting or Indian fighting or the age of 
reason... any thing but make a speech.”22
Because a speaker had to demonstrate that he was capable of making a speech that 
not only looked good in print but also moved and persuaded those who heard it in person, 
the House gallery was a popular spot for other political leaders, particularly members of 
the Senate, who frequently joined concerned citizens in the gallery, watching, listening, 
evaluating each speaker’s political mettle. Observers attended carefully to both the 
words the speaker used and the way he spoke, and were not bashful about recording their 
thoughts in diaries, journals, and letters that were circulated around to friends and 
political allies. Even gifted speakers like Ames were subject to criticism. During one 
visit to the House, William Maclay noted that Ames was long-winded and excessively 
methodical in his orations, and seemed more concerned with superfluous rhetorical 
flourishes than actually making a point. “Ames delivered a long string of studied 
sentences, but he did not use a single argument, which seemed to leave an impression,” 
Maclay recalled. “He had ‘public faith,’ ‘public credit,’ ‘honor, and above all justice,’ as 
often over as an Indian would the ‘Great Spirit.’” For less gifted speakers, the criticism 
was particularly harsh. As a political thinker, James Madison was almost universally 
respected, but even admirers had few words of praise for Madison’ s oratorical
22 Gerry to James Warren, March 22, 1789, in C. Harvey Gardiner, ed., A Study in 
Dissent: The Warren-Gerry Correspondence, 1776-1792 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois 
University Press, 1968), 220; William Eustis to David Cobb, December 4, 6, and 18,
1794, in Freeman, Affairs o f Honor, 33-34.
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performance. Thomas Lowther, a friend of Supreme Court Justice James Iredell, 
lamented that though he “had formed the highest expectations” of James Madison, he 
“had very little opportunity of forming an opinion” of him while observing House 
proceedings, “for whenever he has spoke.. .it has been in so low a tone of voice, that I 
could not well distinguish what he said; his voice appears too defective for so large a 
man.” When Madison’s voice was loud enough to be heard, his voice was often 
“hollow” and “feeble,” according to Zephaniah Swift, and his manner of speaking, 
though technically proper, lacked “energy or expressiveness.” The message was clear: 
gifted and deficient speakers alike had to perform before the inescapable presence of the 
gallery, a live audience of vigilant political leaders and public citizens who could observe 
far more that readers of newspapers ever could.
But despite all that visitors in the gallery could observe, not even they had a 
complete view of the political discourse of the House. For one thing, the gallery was 
physically distinct from the assembly, and visitors observed proceedings from a distance 
great enough to render soft speaking virtually impossible to hear. Politicians sometimes 
“spoke so low as not to be heard in the gallerys,” as the New York Daily Gazette reported 
in January, 1790, thereby using their voices by accident or by design to exclude the 
public audience in their midst during open proceedings. Moreover, the public could be 
further separated by a simple motion by any House member to clear the galleries and 
close proceedings if sensitive information was to be presented or a confidential report 
given. Newspaper reporters always noted when the doors were shut, and included
23 Thomas Lowther to James Iredell, May 9, 1789, in Griffith J. McRee, ed., Life 
and Correspondence o f James Iredell, One o f the Associate Justices o f the Supreme 
Court o f the United States, 2 vols. (New York, 1949) II: 258-59; February 15, 1790, in 
M aclay’s Journal, 197; Swift quote from Grasso, A Speaking Aristocracy, 407.
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whenever possible information regarding the reason for the House’s secrecy. “Mr. 
Wadsworth o f the Committee on that part of the President’ s speech respecting the South- 
Western Frontiers.. informed the House it is ready to report,” the Connecticut Journal 
stated in February, 1790. “[Because of] This report, relating to business of a confidential 
nature, the doors of the gallery were shut.” But members did not need to specify their 
reasons, and a motion to close the House doors to public scrutiny was seldom opposed or 
defeated. The Essex Journal could only report that the House closed its doors after 
receiving a message from the president in January, 1790, and the writer for the Daily 
Advertiser in March, 1792 only knew that Theodore Sedgewick had a report of a 
sensitive nature to present to the House, but did not give specific reasons why the 
galleries needed to be cleared.24 While a formidable presence in the House, the public 
observers in the gallery, like those who read the words of their elected leaders in the 
newspapers, often found themselves on the outside looking in.
For Ames, this was the House’s saving grace, as the gallery provided an easy 
means for the untutored masses to infiltrate the elite discourse o f elected leaders. Few 
things were as moving to the multitudes as excessively passionate orations that were 
devoid of reason or argument, he believed, and few things more quickly corroded the 
speech of educated men. Every speaker who aspired to eloquence had to take care that 
his orations could not be construed as a shameless attempt to manipulate the House by 
playing to the basest and most detestable nature of the uneducated public. When 
Congress considered proposals regarding how the president should be properly addressed
24 New York Daily Gazette, January 20, 1790; Connecticut Journal, February 3, 
1790; Essex Journal, January 27, 1790; Daily Advertiser, March 5, 1792.
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just months after convening in 1789, Ames reported that “a committee of both Houses 
had reported that it is not proper to address the President by any other title than that in the 
Constitution.” After receiving word that the Senate had rejected the report, Republican 
members of the House, one after the other, launched into boisterous and extended tirades 
about the unconstitutionality of titles. Their emotional harangues drew upon every 
appropriate superlative to describe the egregiousness of any presidential title outside that 
prescribed in the Constitution. “The antispeakers edified all aristocratic hearts by their 
zeal against titles. They were not warranted by the Constitution; repugnant to republican 
principles; dangerous, vain, ridiculous, arrogant and damnable,” Ames recalled. “Not a 
soul said a word for titles. But the zeal o f these folks could not have risen higher in case 
of contradiction.” Ames could think of only two possible explanations for such a 
reaction: either their arguments were “intended to hurry the House to a resolve censuring 
the Senate, so as to set the two Houses at odds,” or they were “addressed to the galleries” 
to whip public spectators into a frenzy.25
Unlike those who read about House debates in the newspapers, public visitors 
were privy to a politician’s words as well as his body language, gestures, and voice tone, 
not to mention the reactions o f other observers in attendance, all o f which played a 
crucial role in their assessment of his eloquence. Such a spectacle could never be fully 
represented in the press by creative editing or selective publishing. Every time a 
politician rose to speak, he was cognizant of the gallery, a constantly-changing 
assortment of active public visitors and observant politicians who watched and listened 
and judged, whose impressions would significantly influence his political reputation. But
25 Ames to George Richards Minot, in Works o f Ames, I: 581-82.
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though it offered citizens a chance to personally observe the political discourse most of 
the nation would only read about in print, the gallery, like the press, was nonetheless an 
outside presence that offered a still limited view of national political discourse.
The divide between public perception and the inner workings of national politics 
was distinct from the moment elected leaders convened in 1789. While outsiders praised 
the House as “an organ of popular will” and advocates of a more civic political discourse 
began pressuring the Senate to open its doors as well, many in Congress, particularly in 
the House, were apprehensive about the ability of the Congress to govern effectively. 
Their concern was brought on primarily by how little they knew about one another. John 
Adams lamented that, unlike that of “a Provincial Assembly, where we know a Man’s 
Pedigree and Biography, his Education, Profession and Connections, as well as his 
Fortune,” in national politics, where few preexisting personal connections existed to 
reveal each man’s political strategy or party affiliation, “We frequently see Phenomena 
which puzzles us.” Elbridge Gerry commented that in the House he “has few or no 
connections and friends” and that his colleagues “were in the same body but politically 
sequestered.” Ames in particular did not quite know what to make of his new colleagues 
and their potential to lead the new nation. Though the men he would work with daily 
appeared to be “solid, moderate men, who.. .have considerable experience and honest 
intentions,” he could not deny the strong sense of doubt that made his optimism cautious 
at best. He was distressed by what appeared to be a conspicuous lack of “shining talents” 
among his peers, but his anxiety also stemmed from the fact that he had never met these 
men before, and knew nothing about them. “The House is composed of sober, solid, old-
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character folks, as we often say,” he asserted, before adding: “At least, I am sure that 
there are many such.”26
In an effort to learn as much as possible about the “men and measures” of the 
House, members listened carefully to their colleagues’ orations before the assembly. As 
they listened and spoke to one another over time, they developed an intimate knowledge 
of one another that could only be cultivated by close and constant interaction within the 
secluded realm of elite national politics.27 In the midst of skewed press coverage, a 
vigilant and constantly-changing public audience, and uncertainty about the future of the 
young nation, this intimate contact became both a source o f stability in the midst of 
constant doubt, as well as the source of the toughest criticism a speaker would face.
Though the composition of the assembly changed with each election, the years a 
representative spent within this innermost audience gave him ample time to become 
acquainted with his colleagues and gain an intricate familiarity o f individual speaking 
styles unavailable to the public. As reputation was a politician’s most precious asset, it 
quickly became clear to those in the House that a man’s standing in the public eye and his 
eminence within the assembly were not necessarily equal. Options existed for a 
politician knowledgeable of the powers and limits of both the press and the gallery to 
decrease the likelihood of a negative public image. But before his colleagues, each 
speaker’s elocutionary talent was laid bare and every oratorical faux pas was exposed: if
26 John Adams, diary entry, in Freeman, Affairs o f Honor, 20; Elbridge Gerry to 
James Warren, March 22, 1789, in Gardiner, ed., A Study in Dissent, 219-20; Ames to 
Minot, April 4, 1789, Ames to Samuel Henshaw, April 22, 1789, Ames to William 
Tudor, April 25, 1789, in Works o f Ames, I: 563-66.
27 Gerry to James Warren, March 22, 1789, in Gardiner, ed., A Study in Dissent,
220.
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an orator spoke too softly or too loudly; if he appeared to lack confidence or exude 
arrogance; if his voice could not be heard over the thud of footsteps, the chatter of private 
conversations, and the shuffle of papers, or if his voice was so loud that it was jarring and 
unpleasant; even if the speech was suspected of not being his own; his peers would 
notice, and his political clout within the assembly would suffer.
To a significant extent, a man established his political reputation within the 
assembly with words, and as hard as a reputation was to build, it was harder to maintain, 
and very easy to destroy. While it may have taken a mediocre speaker several 
compelling orations to improve his reputation and convince his colleagues that the first 
one or two had not been a fluke, it only took one misstep to severely damage a man’s 
standing among his peers. While no strategy guaranteed success, speakers routinely 
opted to enlist more eloquent colleagues, often without the colleagues’ knowledge, to 
help them craft their speech. Politicians borrowed terms and phrases from one another 
often, sprinkling in a colleague’s expression or wording into a speech of their own if they 
thought it added something to their argument. Such a practice was often virtually 
undetectable to the general populace, and could be potentially beneficial if it helped 
gamer the speaker public support. Even within the assembly, this practice was perfectly 
acceptable in moderation, as it was understood that each man’s unique speaking style, 
which included both his style o f delivery as well as his word choice, would mb off on his 
colleagues as they heard each other speak.
Carried too far, however, this strategy could backfire and cement the speaker’s 
reputation as an oratorical plagiarist who had nothing substantial of his own to contribute. 
When Thomas Jefferson heard William Loughton Smith deliver a speech that sounded
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too different from Smith’s style to be his own, Jefferson promptly revealed the South
Carolinian’s blunder to James Madison. “I am at no loss to ascribe Smith’s speech to its
true father,” Jefferson wrote.
Every tittle o f it is Hamilton’s except the introduction. There is scarcely anything 
there which I have not heard from [Hamilton] in our various private tho’ official 
discussions. The very turn of the arguments is the same, and others will see as 
well as myself that the style is Hamilton’s. The sophistry is too fine, too ingenius 
even to have been comprehended by Smith, much less devised by him.
Upon finishing, Smith was questioned about various arguments of the speech. Jefferson
remarked that Smith’s reply “shews [sic] he did not understand his first speech: as it’s
general inferiority proves it’s legitimacy as evidently as it does the bastardy of the
original.”28 A speaker could plagiarize or distort words for public visitors and the press
in the galleries, but his colleagues would not be fooled.
Throughout his time in national politics, Ames learned well how crucial the
audience of one’s colleagues was in determining a speaker’s political reputation, making
note of how his colleagues in the House addressed the assembly, and the effectiveness of
their arguments. He considered it an obligation he must fulfill to keep his friends and
political allies in the loop. “It is not easy to write the transactions o f the House,” he
admitted to George Richards Minot, “because I forget the topics which do not reach you
by newspaper.” Ames resolved to provide his closest friends with an accurate picture of
the inner-workings of House debates that could not be reached by an outsider.29
What his observations reveal is a political body whose members judged each
28 Jefferson to Madison, April 3, 1794, in James Morton Smith, ed., The Republic 
o f Letters: The Correspondence Between Jefferson and Madison, 1776-1826, 3 vols. 
(New York: W.W. Norton, 1995), H: 839.
29 Ames to George Richards Minot, May 14, 1789, in Works o f Ames, I: 582.
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other as much on the performances given as the arguments made, each member 
evaluating from a particular point of view that colored his perception of the people with 
whom he interacted and their abilities as speakers. For all the criticism James Madison 
received as a speaker, some listeners, particularly political allies like William Lyman, 
thought him to be the epitome of eloquence, praising the “Accuracy” of his language and 
the “extensive Information” that he cited to make his point. Upon hearing a Madison 
speech, Lyman celebrated the his ability to “[engage] our attention for two hours and a 
half during which time in a full House and thronged with Spectators there was such 
perfect Silence that you might almost have heard a pin fall.”30
Probably Madison’s biggest nemesis in the House, Ames observed Madison 
intently, paying particular attention to both his elocutionary technique and what effect it 
had on the assembly. He made a valiant effort to be more even-handed in his assessment, 
praising Madison as a brilliant political mind, whose ability to “trace.. .through the mazes 
of debate, without losing it” was without peer. He “is cool, and has an air of reflection” 
about him, Ames believed, and “states a principle and deduces consequences with 
clearness and simplicity.” Ames even recognized that Madison’s methodical oratorical 
style could have its advantages. Shortly after the House convened and Ames got to 
observe Madison’s style, he noted that the Virginian’s “printed speeches are more faithful 
than any other person’s because he speaks very slow, and his discourse is strongly 
marked.” In a political environment where “shorthand writers” lurked with other public 
observers in the galleries, taking down a speaker’s words, speaking in a slower, more 
deliberate fashion made it more likely that a speaker’s words would be taken down
30James Madison Papers, XV: 148-49.
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accurately. Moreover, because a Madison performance did not depend on gesture or 
voice tone to persuade, no crucial oratorical intangible would be lost in the conversion to 
printed text, ensuring that the printed speech would be just as persuasive as the original 
performance.31
But Madison’s performances were not usually persuasive, and Ames noted that it 
was his keen intellect, methodical style, and slow cadence that made his speeches tedious 
and uninspiring for the men before him. Though “[h]is clear perception of an argument 
makes him impressive, and persuasive sometimes,” Ames concluded that persuading the 
assembly “is not his forte, however.” Madison was cognizant of the importance of 
performance in his speeches, but seemed incapable of mustering the passion and energy 
his speeches sorely lacked. “He speaks low, his person is little and ordinary,” Ames 
reported. “His language is very pure, perspicuous, and to the point.” Ames concluded 
that he was “a little too much of a book politician, and too timid in his politics.” Though 
he held Madison in high regard as a thinker and a leader, Madison’s speech convinced 
Ames that “he has rather too much theory.. .He is also very timid, and seems evidently to 
want manly firmness and energy of character.” During his time in the House, Ames 
recorded how Madison struggled throughout the years against his cerebral nature to craft 
a speech that would move the assembly, taking note o f Madison’s apparent success or 
failure with his peers. His speech in opposition to the bank bill in 1791, Ames thought, 
was “a dull piece of business” that succeeded only in boring his colleagues. Madison 
“read a long time out of books of debates on the Constitution when considering the 
several states, in order to show that the powers were to be construed.” When Madison
31 Ames to John Lowell, May 2, 1790, in Works o f Ames, I. 733; Ames to George 
Richards Minot, May 18, and May 29, 1789, in Works o f Ames, I: 628, 637.
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finished speaking, he had not only failed to convince Federalists, Ames believed he had 
repelled some Anti-Federalist allies as well. “The decision of the House, by a majority of 
thirty-nine against twenty, is a strong proof of the little impression that was made,” Ames 
believed, “Many of the minority laughed at the objection deduced from the 
Constitution.”32
If one could say anything truly positive about Madison’s speaking style, it was 
that it was genuine. Madison meant what he said, never tried to lead his audience astray 
with exaggerated claims, and was incapable of manipulating the emotions with 
superfluous grandiloquence. Throughout his time in national politics, Ames observed the 
tenor of political discourse beyond Madison, and repeatedly recorded his amazement at 
the level o f emotional, violent, and foolish arguments that too often characterized House 
debate. The debate over the slave trade, he had observed in 1790, was marked by 
“violence, personality, low wit, violation of order, and rambling from the point.” In 
1791, in the midst of a debate over an apportionment proposal, he complained that “the 
spirit of debate bears no proportion to the objects of debate,” lamenting sarcastically that 
debate over such a “pacific” issue had become heated, uncivilized, and downright foolish. 
“We heard.. .about republicanism, and aristocracy, and corruption, and the sense of the 
people, and the amendments, and indeed so much good stuff, that I almost wonder it did
33not hold out longer.” Republicans seemed particularly fond of this elocutionary 
technique, as “[w] e hear, incessantly, from the old foes of the Constitution ‘this is
32 Ames to George Richards Minot, May 3, May 18, and May 29, 1789; and 
February 17, 1791 in Works o f Ames, I: 569, 628, 637-38 and II: 863-64.
33 Ames to George Richards Minot, March 23, 1790 and November 30, 1791, in 
Works o f Ames, I: 130, and II: 878-79.
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unconstitutional, and that is;7 and indeed, what is not? I scarce know a point which has 
not produced this cry, not excepting a motion for adjourning.” Ames’s scrutiny could 
and often did focus on individuals who were particularly offensive. In 1790 he 
complained in a letter to Thomas Dwight that though Dwight was not in New York, 
James Jackson of Georgia had “made a speech, which I will not say was loud enough for 
you to hear. It disturbed the Senate, however; and to keep out the din, they put down 
their windows.” During the Jay Treaty debate, Virginia Republican William Branch 
Giles demonstrated “no scruples, and certainly less sense.” Giles went “into a rambling 
debate, exciting the passions against this and that article o f the treaty.”34
Ames, once again, was not alone in his assessment. Other political leaders, 
including Giles, whose own biographer called a “vigorous, erratic, and often uncharitable 
debater,” remarked as well about “the style of eloquence that has lately been introduced 
into this place,” and “was sorry to say.. that there was at least as much irritation as 
deliberate judgment.” Jackson’s reputation as an excessively boisterous speaker was 
well-known. When William Loughton Smith lamented that John Francis Mercer, “a new 
orator in the House,” was “louder than Jackson,” his remark needed no further 
explanation.35
This jarring rhetoric troubled Ames far more than Madison’s dull and tedious
34 Ames to George Richards Minot, March 23, 1790 and March 8, 1792, in Works 
o f Ames, 1 : 730 and II: 938; Ames to Thomas Dwight and Ames to Christopher Gore,
July 29, 1790 and March 11 and 12, 1796, in Works o f Ames, I: 835 and II: 1138-39.
35 Dice Robins Anderson, William Branch Giles: A Biography (Menasha, 
Wisconsin: George Banta Publishing, 1914), 16-17; The Massachusetts Mercury, Dec. 5- 
Dec. 9, 1794; Smith to Edward Routledge, March 24, 1792, in Freeman, Affairs o f  
Honor, 300-301, note 26.
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speeches, which at worst were simply boring and unconvincing, because of what it 
implied about the speaker’s choice of audience. Eloquent speech required both passion 
and reason in a delicate balance. Both naked enthusiasm and passionless deliberation 
reduced the pace of debate to a crawl, which irritated members to no end, but whereas 
Madison’s bookishness simply lacked the passion to move the heart, the endless 
“rambling” harangues of his colleagues seemed to indicate a desire to circumvent the 
assembly members’ ability to check their passion with reason, and compel them to 
dismiss reasoned argument in the heat of the moment on the basis of feeling alone. One 
could not help but wonder who, exactly, a speaker who employed such tactics hoped to 
convince: an assembly of educated leaders who would not likely be swayed by such 
tactics, or the emotional and potentially violent masses, who were more likely to be 
persuaded by weak or misleading argument, particularly i f  it came wrapped in flourishing 
gestures and pretty words. Given that inside the assembly speakers were judged as much 
by how they spoke as what they said, and that they so keenly feared the usurpation and 
distortion of their words by the press outside the House chamber, it seemed 
unconscionable to Ames that elite national leaders would willingly concede the wise and 
reasoned debate that was integral to eloquence in favor of adversarial and ostentatious 
argument for the purpose of appealing to the masses. And yet, as the controversy over 
Jay’s Treaty reached its peak intensity, Ames could only conclude that that was precisely 
the choice many of his colleagues had made.
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CHAPTER 2
THE JAY TREATY AND THE INNER AUDIENCE 
In March, 1794, news of British capture of American merchant vessels sent many 
Americans into a panic. The possibility of an impending war with either of the feuding 
nations o f England or France was a frightening thought, given the United States’ current 
position of neutrality, the comparatively modest size o f its forces, and its continued 
recovery from the Revolution. Washington named John Jay a special ambassador to 
Great Britain to broker a treaty between England and the United States. Shortly after his 
departure, despite considering Jay’s abilities as a negotiator average at best, Republicans 
began to remark about the “easy task” their ambassador faced, thanks to the “Bankruptcy, 
Humility, and disgrace,” in the words of Josiah Parker, resulting from the war with 
France, which left England all but powerless at the negotiating table. Parker concluded 
that “if we do not get all we ask it must be the fault o f our Negotiator at the court of 
London.” James Madison agreed. “It is expected,” he believed, “that he will accomplish 
much if not all he aims at.”36
Ames was suspicious o f such comments. It was not reasonable to expect a man 
charged with negotiating a treaty of this magnitude to get everything he wanted, and the 
task before Jay would certainly not be easy. Ames believed Republicans were gearing up
36 Elkins and McKitrick, The Age o f Federalism, 415-422; Combs, The Jay 
Treaty, 159-63.
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to preemptively reject the treaty in both Congress and the public eye, and he dreaded 
what would happen once the treaty was made public. He wrote to Thomas Dwight that 
he expected print, particularly newspapers, to be the primary medium Republicans would 
use, going so far as to single out Benjamin Franklin Bache’s Aurora General Advertiser 
as the paper that would catalyze public rejection of Jay’s treaty. “I see a little cloud, as 
big as a man’s hand, in Bache’s paper, that indicates a storm.” He made two predictions 
regarding the message these newspapers would spread, discerned from what Republicans 
were already saying in the halls of Congress. “First, before the event is known,” his 
Republican colleagues would “raise the expectations o f the public, that we have 
everything granted, and nothing given in return; and secondly, that the treaty, when 
published, has surrendered everything.”37 As time passed and anxiety over the treaty 
intensified, the first prediction appeared to be already coming to fruition. It would not be 
long before the finalized treaty found its way into the hands of the press, and the second 
would be realized.
In July, 1795, a special session of the Senate convened to consider the finalized 
treaty, and despite successful passage by Federalists to keep their deliberations secret, the 
terms of the treaty quickly found their way into local newspapers. Though the Senate 
ratified it by the year’s end, the deliberation process resulted in more headaches for Ames 
and his allies. The terms of the treaty left much to be desired. The United States’ trading 
rights to India and the British West Indies were severely restricted. The U.S. also had to 
submit to a commission that would decide maritime disputes. Perhaps worst of all, the 
treaty remained silent on the issue of British impressments of merchant vessels and
37 Ames to Thomas Dwight, February 3, 1795, in Works o f Ames, II: 1101-02; 
Pasley, ‘The Tyranny o f Printers,' 91-94.
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American sailors, the very issue that had sent many Americans into a frenzy and 
necessitated the treaty’s brokerage in the first place. True to Ames’s prediction, Bache’s 
Aurora was one of the first to publish the treaty, and its editor soon organized and 
spearheaded the “storm” that united political figures, newspaper editors, and much of the 
general public against the treaty. Everything about the treaty was ripe for attack, right 
down to the Federalists’ insistence on secrecy. “No doubt that the treaty will be 
unacceptable to the public,” one newspaper editor wrote, “for if it would prove agreeable 
to them, it would not be concealed.” In addition to newspaper essays and other written 
materials, public demonstrations, many o f them intense and even violent, ensued around 
the country. Federalists attempted to marshal support for the treaty anywhere they could, 
but they often encountered more hostile detractors than allies, as was the case in New 
York, where protestors threw rocks at speakers, one of which struck Alexander Hamilton 
in the head.38
Mobbish panic and violence was not limited to crowds on the street; it was also 
conspicuous in organized public assemblies, and to Ames, what was worse was that many 
who opposed the treaty seemed to be shamelessly cultivating such behavior. “I am sorry 
to perceive that Boston is in a very inflammatory state,” he wrote to Oliver Wolcott 
shortly after the Senate began its deliberations and the treaty’s terms had become fodder 
for public scrutiny.
I was there two days ago, and I learnt that the Jacobins have been successful in
prejudicing the multitude against the treaty. What is more to be lamented, almost
38 Elkins and McKitrick, The Age o f Federalism, 415-422; Pasley, ‘The Tyranny 
o f Printers, ’ Chapter 4, esp. 91-93; Argus and Greenleaf’s New Daily Advertiser (New 
York), June 24, 1795. For more on the treaty and the public reaction, see Combs, The 
Jay Treaty, 159-63; and Estes, “‘The Most Bewitching Piece of Parliamentary Oratory.’”
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all the merchants and steady men are said to feel the prevailing fever.. .A town- 
meeting is expected, and if it should be convened, I expect its proceedings will be 
marked with folly and violence... The Jacobins... have the possession of the 
ground, and they will not fail to fortify themselves in their acquisition. The 
country is yet perfectly calm, but pains will be taken to inflame it.39
Ames felt politically powerless as he listened to the debates in the months
following his return to the House, still battling the illness that had rendered him a near
invalid in his home in Dedham. Still weak and under his doctor’s orders not to
participate in the debate, he was a helpless bystander amid the constant bickering and
squabbling that had come to characterize the tenor o f House debate. Republican speeches
painted fantastic and terrifying pictures o f a future under the Jay Treaty, alleging that it
would surrender both commercial and military power to England, leaving the United
States economically impotent and militarily defenseless. The agreement granted Great
Britain too much power, they chorused, and in the wake of its passage, the United States
would see either a usurpation of its autonomy either at the hands of the British army or a
President who would cite the treaty’s terms as justification to exceed his Constitutional
authority. Under the treaty, William B. Giles argued, “commerce shall not be regulated,”
“property shall not be sequestrated,” and “piracies shall be judged as [the President]
thinks fit.” “[I]f he is to exercise the ultimate Treaty-making power contended for,” he
asked, “what security have we that he may not go further with Great Britain? What
security have we that he will not agree with Great Britain, that if she will keep up an
Army of ten thousand men in Canada, he will do the same here?” “While professing, as
the Treaty does, that there were important parts of our commerce left for future
negotiation, why bind us to continue to Great Britain the fullest share of our commercial
39 Ames to Oliver Wolcott, July 9, 1795, in Works o f Ames, II: 1107-08.
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privileges?” Virginia Republican John Nicholas asked. The United States possessed few 
“weapons,” either commercial or military, “that can reach Great Britain, and I greatly fear 
that, when this is lost, we are completely disarmed.” Federalists retorted that such 
objections were not only exaggerated, but also moot because the House had no 
Constitutional right to reject a treaty that had already been agreed to by the President and 
ratified by the Senate. William Vans Murray made the argument, seconded immediately 
by Daniel Buck, that the treaty “has been issued, by the President’s proclamation, as an 
act obligatory upon the United States.. If the President.. has the power, with the consent 
of the two-thirds of the Senate, to ratify a Treaty, the House has no right to investigate the 
merits o f the Treaty, unless they have a right to reject it.”40
Ironically, one of the few things both sides could agree on was that the initial 
public reaction to the treaty had been premature and overblown, and borne more out of 
“sophistry and zeal for the instrument than a wish to discover truth, or a design to 
enlighten the people of the United States,” as Virginia Republican John Nicholas put it. 
Speakers repeatedly resolved to disable their emotions and become “dispassionate 
observers,” who would “pause, and consider” every aspect of the treaty before judging. 
They vowed that emotion, which had fueled the violent public reaction to the treaty, 
would not triumph in House deliberations. “[Ajppeals to fears and panics” were “made 
for the want of solid argument,” Massachusetts Republican Samuel Lyman conceded, but 
they were antithetical to the task of evaluating the treaty in a deliberate and responsible 
manner. He boasted that his own emotions “would never be so operated upon, as to
40 Annals o f Congress, 4th Congress, 1st Session, (March 7, 1795, and March 11 
and April 16, 1796), 429-30, 512, 1015.
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overwhelm his judgment, and that all attempts of that sort would be without the least 
effect.” “Zeal or enthusiasm,” Federalist colleague William Lyman proclaimed, “is as 
contagious as the small-pox, or any cutaneous disease.” 41
Ames could hardly stomach the scene. House members appeared to be doing 
precisely what they pledged they would not do, turning what was supposed to be a 
spirited but reasoned debate into an irrational fight that seemed to favor volume over 
intelligence, all the while denying their own emotional involvement and losing sight of 
the changing tenor of public opinion outside the assembly. “I sit now in the House, and, 
that I may not lose my temper and my spirits, I shut my ears against the sophisms and 
rant against the treaty,” he wrote to Thomas Dwight. “Never was a time when I so much 
desired the full use of my faculties, and it is the very moment when I am prohibited even 
attention. To be silent, neutral, useless, is a situation not to be envied.”42 Convinced that 
a speech was the only way to reach his colleagues before their “sophisms and rant” killed 
any hope of its passage, Ames rose, determined to speak despite his weakened and ill 
state, and delivered one last plea of support to his colleagues in the House.
Ames began and concluded his speech by highlighting his illness, a technique 
reminiscent o f George Washington’s speech before a gathering of revolutionary army 
veterans in 1783, and John Hancock’s speech before the Massachusetts Ratifying 
convention in 1788. In those speeches, Washington and Hancock had both affected their 
listeners’ hearts by calling attention to a sickness or ailment that impaired their abilities, 
Hancock claiming he was prevented offering his opinion on the proposed constitution
41 Ibid., (March 11, March 16, and April 15, 1796), 512, 601-02, 989, 991.
42 Ames to Thomas Dwight, March 9, 1796, in Works o f Ames, II: 1136.
43
because of an illness, which he overcame at a key moment in the proceedings, and 
Washington noting to an audience of fellow soldiers that his old age had rendered him 
near “blind” and required him to wear spectacles to read to them a letter from a 
congressman. To begin his speech, Ames expressed “the hope, perhaps a rash one, that 
my strength will hold me out to speak a few minutes.” Ames drew his oration to a close 
by noting that “[t]hose who see me will believe that the reduced state o f my health has 
unfitted me, almost equally, for such exertion of mind and body,” simultaneously 
underscoring the treaty’s tremendous impact on the future of the nation and his 
considerable resolve to speak on its behalf “There is... no member who will not think his 
chance to be a witness of the consequences greater than mine. If, however, the vote 
should pass to reject, and a spirit should rise, as it will with the public disorders to make 
confusion worse confounded, even I, slender and almost broken as my hold upon life is, 
may outlive the government and Constitution of my country.”43
Perhaps what is most striking (and perplexing) about Ames’s speech in support of 
the Jay Treaty is that it only addresses the specifics o f the treaty tangentially, and appears 
(at least at first glance) to discuss the political discourse surrounding the treaty in a way 
that appears contradictory to its author’s staunchly Federalist political philosophy. Ames
43 Ames, “Speech on the Jay Treaty,” hereafter cited as “Speech,” in Works o f 
Ames, II: 1143, 1181-82; William Safire, Lend M e Your Ears: Great Speeches in History 
(New York: W. W. Norton, 2004), 103-06. By offering himself as a personification of 
the weak and vulnerable young nation, Gustafson argues, Ames cloaked himself in what 
she calls “the authenticity o f the public voice,” which “encouraged a passionate 
immersion into the particular human realities which gave substance to the debate in the 
House.” See Gustafson, Eloquence is Power, 244. Ames also mentioned his declining 
health in the middle o f his speech as well, noting as he addressed the degree to which a 
treaty with Great Britain binds the people of the American nation, that “I have not had the 
health to make very laborious researches into this subject.” Ames, “Speech,” 1166.
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began his speech by describing the tenor of political debate in the House. National 
leaders were familiar with the violent and hostile public demonstrations against the 
treaty, and had sworn repeatedly in the House that the passions would play no part in 
their deliberations. Ames issued a stem warning against attempting to eliminate the 
passions from the debate. “Let us not affect to deny the existence and the intrusion of 
some portion of prejudice and feeling into the debate,” he said, “when, from the very 
structure o f our nature, we ought to anticipate the circumstance is a probability, and when 
we are admonished by the evidence of our senses that it is a fact .” It was not reasonable 
that members of the House should expect to be completely objective and free from 
emotion, for “[w]e are men, and, therefore, not exempt from those passions; as citizens 
and Representatives, we feel the interest that must excite them. The hazard of great 
interests cannot fail to agitate strong passions: we are not disinterested, it is impossible 
we should be dispassionate.” Not only was it impossible to purge the human heart of all 
passion, Ames continued, it was undesirable for the purpose of political discourse, for 
“[t]he only constant agents in political affairs are the passions of men.” The passions 
were a natural part of politics because they were a natural part of man. “Shall we say that 
man ought to have been made otherwise?” he asked the House. “It is right already, 
because He, from whom we derive our nature, ordained it so; and because thus made, and 
thus acting, the cause o f truth and the public good is the more surely promoted. ” For 
evidence of this, Ames stated, Representatives needed to look no further than the people 
they represented. Though “[t]he public attention has been quickened to mark the 
progress of the discussion,” and that its opinion about the treaty had been no doubt 
influenced by the zeal and emotion the significance of the treaty’s fate had caused, he
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declared that “its judgment, often hasty and erroneous on first impressions, has become 
solid and enlightened at last.”44
Given what is known about Ames and what has been argued about the 
relationship between elected leaders and the public, scholars have reason to be thrown by 
his speech. Why would an elitist like Ames, who feared the power of the emotional and 
overzealous public and the threat it posed to the rational discourse of national politicians, 
choose to praise the passions as a necessary component to political discourse and single 
out the masses as an example for the House to follow? Where are the descriptions of the 
“licentious and mobbish” masses, who lacked “nine-tenths of the good sense there is” and 
who needed the steady guidance of their betters to lead with the reason and refinement 
they lacked? Where is the fear and distrust of the public passions that necessitated 
republican government in the first place? To whom is Ames speaking, exactly, and what 
is he saying?
In the process of trying to answer these important questions, scholars have 
typically used Ames’s speaking style as their starting point. Despite an abundance of 
general descriptions from contemporaries attesting to Ames’s elocutionary greatness, few 
give any useful specifics about the way he spoke or the techniques he used.
Nevertheless, scholars argue that the source o f Ames’s eloquence was his ability to 
effectively speak the universal language of the passions, to wield what Gustafson calls his 
“form of representative speech intended to clarify and enlarge the popular voice” to 
manipulate his audience to do his will. In this regard, scholars agree, the Jay Treaty 
Speech was vintage Ames, a successful attempt by “the wiliest demagogue in the House,”
44 Ames, “Speech,” 1144-45.
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to encourage his colleagues to decide the treaty’s fate based on emotion. By wielding his 
elocutionary power before his colleagues, by praising the public and encouraging his 
peers to decide the matter as the general populace had, Ames, according to Ferrell, 
“enlivened the debate by adding the element of human passion.” Gustafson puts it more 
bluntly: “The emotional manipulation intrinsic to his endeavor was neither subtle nor 
disguised,” she writes. “Ames frankly performed the operations of emotional stimulation 
and control on his audience” and in so doing, compelled them to approve Jay’s Treaty.45 
Ames’s speeches did, no doubt, employ techniques of performance that heightened the 
effectiveness o f his words, but there are two problems with this characterization that call 
its accuracy into question, at least with regard to Ames’s greatest speech. For one thing, 
moving the passions through bold, extemporaneous performance requires a great sum of 
energy, something Ames was sorely lacking when he rose to deliver his speech in support 
of Jay’s Treaty. He was visibly ill, described by observers as “a mere ghost” in the 
months prior to his oration, and thus was likely not the lively, captivating demagogue 
scholars envision. More importantly, Ames was unambiguous about his distrust of the 
masses, and his distaste for manipulative demagogues who wielded power by controlling 
the emotions of the public. It makes little sense to think that a man who so feared the 
influence of the public would adopt a speaking style that appealed to the very thing he 
detested.46 Ultimately, scholars are forced to gloss over these considerations, or throw up
45 Elkins and McKitrick, The Age o f Federalism , 448; Farrell, “Fisher Ames and 
Political Judgment,” 431; Gustafson, Eloquence is Power, 244.
46 For descriptions of the “ghostly” Ames, see Bernhard, Fisher Ames, 252, 264;
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their hands and concede that the contradiction cannot be reconciled. We can never 
completely know why Ames was compelled to craft his speech the way he did, but if we 
view the Jay Treaty Speech with an eye toward the divide that existed between the 
different audiences speakers faced, and the ways in which politicians used speech and 
print in distinct ways to reach these audiences, we will be able to view more completely 
one of the great orators in American history, and understand more clearly the significance 
of his greatest work.
Ames’s appreciation for the power of public opinion even in the months prior to 
his speech is not lost on scholars. Todd Estes notes that Ames recognized that swaying 
public opinion would be crucial to ensuring the treaty’s approval in the House, and that 
he believed the most effective way to combat the public’ s “profound ignorance” of the 
treaty was through publication o f “temperance and masterly vindications of the treaty” 
either “in gazettes” or “[b]etter, if in a pamphlet .” Ames spearheaded a nearly year-long 
Federalist campaign that utilized public letters, essays, and pamphlets to sway the minds 
of Americans. Among the most prolific writers in support of the treaty were “Camillus,” 
a pseudonym shared by Alexander Hamilton and Rufus King, and “Curtius,” the pen 
name of Noah Webster. Their tactic was to offset the overwhelming criticism of the 
treaty detractors by acknowledging the treaty’s imperfections but downplaying them in 
favor of its strengths. Their writings, like his Jay Treaty speech, described in detail the 
importance of public opinion in the treaty debate, the effects rej ection of the treaty would 
have upon American commerce, and the threat o f war from aggressive Indian tribes. By 
the time o f Ames’s speech in April, 1796, he and many Federalists believed that their 
words o f support for the treaty echoed the public will they had worked so hard to
48
cultivate.47
But Ames also believed that his colleagues would not likely be convinced by 
mere words on a page. He repeated the themes Federalists had emphasized in their print 
campaign, and made sure to underscore the divide between the public outside the House 
chambers and the inner audience before him. The language of his speech, right down to 
his use of pronouns like “we,” “they,” and “us,” make it clear that though he was 
advocating on behalf of what he believed to be in the best interests of the nation, he was 
addressing the inner audience of House members, who alone would decide the treaty’s 
fate with their voices and their votes. The House could only legitimately justify rejection 
of the treaty if “two rules which ought to guide us in this case” were met, he believed. 
First, “[t]he Treaty must appear to be bad, not merely in the petty details, but in its 
character, principle, and mass. And, in the next place, this ought to be ascertained by the 
decided and general concurrence o f the enlightened public.” As he discussed both the 
issues of commerce and the potential o f war with England, issues repeatedly brought up 
as the most glaring weaknesses of the treaty, he argued that when it came to commercial 
concerns, the people who make their livelihood through commerce and trade were the 
best judges of the treaty’s merit on this issue. He asked his colleagues: “What has 
blinded the eyes of the merchants and traders? Surely they are not enemies of trade, or 
ignorant o f their own interests.. They wait with anxious fear lest you should annul that 
contract, on which all hopes are rested.”48
47 Ames to Wolcott, July 9, 1795, in Works o f Ames, II: 1108; Estes, ‘“The Most 
Bewitching Piece o f Parliamentary Oratory.’”
48 Ames, “Speech,” 1152, 1156.
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For the length of his political career, Ames had never kept secret his opinion that 
the public was too inherently emotional and overzealous to be left to its own devices. It 
is tempting, therefore, to ignore these statements which appear to contradict his brand of 
conservative Federalism, or to conclude that he was simply attempting to manipulate the 
passions o f his colleagues by encouraging them to adopt the public’s passionate nature. 
But Ames had not forsaken his own Federalist ideology, and if we read on carefully, 
Ames explains his perplexing opening praise of the passions and the public.
Though he understood the role public opinion played in shaping national political 
discourse, Ames still held fast to the belief that effective governance began with elected 
leaders themselves. The public was in need of guidance from political leaders who could 
lead with both passion and reason, and it was in this important task that the House was 
failing. Rather than provide legitimate reasons for rejecting the treaty that demonstrated 
careful reflection upon its merits as well as its drawbacks, critics in the House seemed 
content to reject the treaty based on preconceived beliefs and arguments based on 
emotion rather than fact. “No government, not even a despotism, will break its faith 
without some pretext,” Ames warned the House. If the House was going to reject the 
treaty, he reminded his colleagues, its reason “must be plausible.” As the leaders of the 
nation, their decision “must be such as will carry the public opinion along with it,” for if 
the public was not convinced their elected leaders were acting in the best interest of the 
nation, more violence and chaos would ensue. Making decisions for the good of the 
nation, and articulating the rationale behind those reasons in a way that made the public 
confident enough in the government to trust its judgment, was the responsibility of every 
national leader. A government that that did not fulfill this obligation was “the corrupter
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of its citizens.” “Will the laws continue to prevail in the hearts of the people when the
respect that gives them efficacy is withdrawn from the legislators? How shall we punish
vice while we practise it?” Ames asked.
We have not force, and vain will be our reliance when we have forfeited the 
resources of opinion. To weaken government and to corrupt morals, are effects of 
a breach of faith not to be prevented—and from effects they become causes, 
producing, with augmenting activity, more disorder and more corruption; order 
will be disturbed, and the life of the public liberty shortened.49
How had the House faltered so severely in its obligation to its citizens? Not only
had its members seemed all too willing to ignore reason in favor of emotional bellowing
and bickering, Ames argued, they insisted all the while that passion played no part in
their deliberations at all. “Our understandings have been addressed, it is true, and with
ability and effect,” he conceded,
but, I demand, has any comer of the heart been left unexplored? It has been 
ransacked to find auxiliary arguments, and, when that attempt failed, to awaken 
the sensibilities that would require none. Every prejudice and feeling have been 
summoned to listen to some particular style o f address and yet we seem to 
believe, and to consider a doubt as an affront, that we are strangers to any 
influence but that o f unbiased reason.
Opponents in the House who claimed their arguments reflected the will o f their
constituents continued to describe in detail the fate of the nation should the treaty pass.
Their descriptions were vivid in detail and apocalyptic in scope, but Ames argued that
they seldom demonstrated a close reading of the treaty, and seemed only to serve as a
means for opponents to inflame the House and attempt to marshal public support back to
their side. “We hear it said that this is a struggle for liberty, a manly resistance against
the design to nullify this assembly, and to make it a cipher in the government,” Ames
said. “That the President and the Senate, the numerous meetings in the cities, and the
49 Ibid., 1155-56.
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influence of the general alarm of the country, are the agents and instruments of a scheme 
of coercion and terror, to force the Treaty down our throats, though we loathe it, and in 
spite of the clearest convictions of duty and conscience.” Such contentions served only 
to “oppose an obstacle to the path of inquiry, not simply discouraging, but absolutely 
insurmountable. They will not yield to argument; for, as they were not reasoned up, they 
cannot be reasoned down.’00
Ames pursued this theme further. As long as passion dominated debate, “all 
argument is useless.. The ears may be open, but the mind will remain locked up, and 
every pass to the understanding guarded.” By denying that the emotions would have any 
influence on the treaty debate, national leaders had allowed the debate to deteriorate into 
an orgy o f wild accusations and enthusiastic rhetoric that was more reminiscent of the 
masses than an assembly of elected leaders. What’s more, they had infected the public 
with their panic and overzealousness. “The Treaty-alarm,” Ames argued, “was purely an 
address to the imagination and prejudices of the citizens, and not on that account the less 
formidable. Objections that proceed upon error, in fact or calculation, may be traced and 
exposed. But such as are drawn from the imagination, or addressed to it, elude definition, 
and return to domineer over the mind, after having been banished from it by truth.” Like 
a wildfire, “[t]he alarm spread faster than the publication of the treaty,” engulfing the 
populace with anticipatory hostility and unfounded suspicions until “[tjhere were more 
critics than readers.” And though the Federalist campaign on the treaty’s behalf had 
allayed many o f the public’s fears about the treaty, the assembly of men who would cast 
their votes still harbored this alarm, and still allowed it to dictate the tenor o f their debate.
50 Ibid., 1144-46.
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“It is my right to avow that passions so impetuous, enthusiasm so wild, could not subsist 
without disturbing the sober exercise of reason, without putting at risk the peace and 
precious interests of our country.” He pleaded with his colleagues to “see the subject 
once more in its singleness and simplicity” not by jettisoning reason in favor of emotion, 
but to by recognizing “that it is barely possible they have yielded too suddenly to their 
alarms for the powers of this House; that the addresses which have been made with such 
variety o f forms, and with so great dexterity in some of them, to all that is prejudice and 
passion in the heart, are either the effects or the instruments of artifice and deception.”51 
As surprising as these arguments may seem today, it no doubt surprised his 
colleagues in the House even more. Fisher Ames, widely known for his insistence that 
the public’s “licentious and mobbish” nature and its lack of “nine-tenths of the good 
sense there is” necessitated governance by refined and rational political leaders, now 
argued that the source of the “treaty alarm” that hampered debate was not the public but 
the very Representatives before him, and that the only way for the House to view the 
treaty “in its singleness and simplicity” was to recognize that the passions were a 
necessary part of political debate and more willingly consider the treaty’s strengths as 
well as its weaknesses, as the American people had. We can imagine House members 
listening intently to his speech, shifting nervously in their seats, flabbergasted by the 
indictments being levied against them, their shock only exacerbated by the fact that it was 
Ames articulating them.
But Ames assured his listeners that all was not lost. After all, public opinion had 
shifted gradually, and only as a result of the intense print campaign initiated by
51 Ibid., 1147-48; 1154, 1157-58.
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Federalists. What separated elected leaders from the public was not their lack of 
emotion, but their ability to acknowledge the role the passions played in debate and to 
check their emotions with reason. Ames was confident, therefore, that though “[t]he 
language of passion and exaggeration may silence that of sober reason in other places, it
52has not done it here.”
Appealing to “the magnanimity and candor of those who hear me,” Ames 
expended what little energy he retained by using vivid, dramatic language to make his 
case on behalf of the treaty. As it was imperative not to deny the place of the passions in 
the treaty debate, he believed it nonetheless behooved the House, “[bjefore we resolve to 
leap into this abyss,” to “pause and reflect upon such o f the dangers that are obvious and 
inevitable.”53 Renewing his assertion that the treaty was vital for American commerce, 
Ames focused on the affect its rejection would have on the families o f American 
merchants. “Five millions o f dollars, and probably more, on the score of spoliations 
committed on our commerce, depend upon the Treaty. The Treaty offers the only 
prospect of indemnity. Such redress is promised as the merchants place some confidence 
in. Will you interpose and frustrate that hope, leaving to many families nothing but 
beggary and despair?” Ames asked. “It takes less than half an hour to call the yeas and 
nays, and reject the Treaty. But what is the effect of it? What, but this: the very men, 
formerly so loud for redress.. now turn their capricious fury upon the sufferers, and say, 
by their vote, to them and their families, “No longer eat bread! Petitioners, go home and
52 Ibid., 1152.
53 Ibid., 1162.
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starve; we cannot satisfy your wrongs and our resentments!”54 But even more vulnerable 
to harm were settlers on the frontier, as rejection of the treaty would mean the loss of the 
western military posts, which settlers relied upon to protect them against Indian attacks. 
Ames’s dramatic description of the bloodshed they would suffer at the hands of 
aggressive Indian tribes is worth quoting in full:
If any... should maintain that the peace with the Indians will be stable 
without the posts, to them I will urge another reply. From arguments calculated to 
produce conviction, I will appeal directly to the hearts of those who hear me, and 
ask whether it is not already planted there? I resort especially to the convictions 
of the Western gentlemen, whether, supposing no posts and no treaty, the settlers 
will remain in security? Can they take it upon them to say that an Indian peace, 
under these circumstances, will prove firm? No, sir, it will not be peace, but a 
sword; it will be no better than a lure to draw victims within the reach of the 
tomahawk.
On this theme, my emotions are unutterable. If  I could find words for 
them—if my powers bore any proportion to my zeal—I would swell my voice to 
such a note of remonstrance it should reach every log-house beyond the 
mountains. I would say to the inhabitants, Wake from your false security! Your 
cruel dangers—your more cruel apprehensions—are soon to be renewed; the 
wounds, yet unhealed, are to be tom open again. In the day time, your path 
through the woods will be ambushed; the darkness o f midnight will glitter with 
the blaze of your dwellings. You are a father: the blood of your sons shall fatten 
your corn-field! You are a mother: the war-whoop shall wake the sleep of the 
cradle!
Drawing his speech to a close, he argued that far more danger lurked in the “abyss” of 
uncertainty that surrounded the nation’s future if the treaty were rejected, and urged his 
colleagues to “not hesitate, then, to agree to the appropriation to carry it into faithful 
execution.”55
Considering his oration with an understanding of how the divide between political 
leaders and the general public shaped political discourse, we can gain new insight into
54 Ibid., 1172.
55 Ibid., 1174-75, 1181
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Ames and his historic speech. Despite the success of treaty supporters to enlighten the 
public about Jay’s Treaty, the House was still tangled in the “sophisms and rant” that 
were borne out of a desire to incite further animosity toward the treaty while its members 
denied they harbored any passions at all. Far from a manipulative demagogue looking to 
inflame the House with emotion, Ames’s plea on behalf of Jay’s Treaty reveals a speaker 
who understood the divide between public and political audiences, and who attempted to 
save the House from the emotion its members had allowed to overtake the treaty debate. 
The message of the speech is clear: what should have been a genuinely impassioned and 
informed discussion between political leaders had become an argument ungovemed by 
reason and ruled by a zeal to control public opinion, but in their haste to rekindle popular 
outrage against the treaty, it seemed treaty opponents had lost touch with the public they 
hoped to convince, as well as the audience of colleagues they needed to persuade.
After nearly an hour, an exhausted Ames yielded the floor, and responses 
immediately followed. John Adams wrote to his wife “Our feelings beat in unison,” and 
noted that Supreme Court Justice James Iredell, seated beside him, simply said “My God! 
How great he is!” Jonathan Dayton, Speaker of the House and consistent opponent of the 
treaty, declared that he would be voting in its favor. Ames’ friend Jeremiah Smith had 
evaluated his speech by telling him that he “ought to have died in the fifth act; that he 
never will have an occasion so glorious, having lost this he will now be obliged to make 
his exit like other men.” Some Federalists moved for an immediate vote, only to have 
their call postponed by Republicans, who no doubt feared just how influential Ames’s 
performance had been.56 Though scholars maintain that the extent to which Ames’s
56 Bernhard, Fisher Ames, 272-274; Estes, ‘“ The Most Bewitching Piece of
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speech affected the final vote is a matter of debate, even those critical of the speech 
offered no argument that it would be insignificant. The Boston Independent Chronicle 
wrote that Ames "‘let loose his imagination... and his mind enfeebled by disease, shrunk 
from the mighty monster which Great Britain presented to his affrighted view,” and 
feared his speech was “little short of a declaration of the surrender of our sovereignty and 
independence and that we must hereafter depend on the mercy of [Britain] .” Though 
Albert Gallatin thought it “was delivered in reference to the expediency of making the 
appropriations, and treated but incidentally of the constitutional question,” he could not 
deny that it was “the most brilliant and eloquent speech” o f the debate, and that its 
author’s place as the most gifled orator in Congress was assured. “I may here say that 
though there were, during my six years of Congressional service, many clever men in the 
Federal party in the House (Griswold, Bayerd, Harper, Otis, Smith o f South Carolina, 
Dana, Tracy, Hillhouse, Sitgreaves, etc.) I met with but two superior men. Ames.. .and 
John Marshall.”57
The next day, the House voted to uphold the treaty, fifty-one to forty-eight, and 
though pleased with the result, Ames’s failing health prevented him from running for re- 
election. He practiced law for a time in his remaining years, wrote letters to close friends 
and published a number of essays, and was even offered the presidency of Harvard 
College, a position he declined. Though he died in 1808, he would be remembered 
throughout the nineteenth century as future generations of politicians, including Abraham 
Lincoln and Daniel Webster, read his famous speech in their youth and learned of his
Parliamentary Oratory,’” 20-21.
57 Bernhard, Fisher Ames, 273.
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exploits in the House. Ames’s abilities as an orator spoke to many like John Adams, who 
by Ames’s death was a professor of rhetoric at Harvard, as proof that, “under 
governments purely republican, where every citizen has a deep interest in the affairs of 
the nation, and, in some form o f public assembly or other, has the means and opportunity 
of delivering his opinions, and of communicating his sentiments by speech; where 
government itself has no arms but those of persuasion,” a new Golden Age of oratory 
might arise.58
But for those of us straining through two centuries of American history to see how 
the nation’s first national leaders communicated, Fisher Ames takes on an added 
importance. His perspective not only illustrates the divide between the intimately related 
worlds of speech and print, it also reminds us that, though well-aware of the power the 
ubiquitous and unblinking public eye possessed to shape the discourse o f national 
politics, national leaders understood that that discourse took place before an inner 
audience of fellow politicians, who witnessed each speaker’s performance with a critical 
eye and ear the public could not match. We cannot legitimately claim to possess a 
complete understanding of the political history of the early republic until we more closely 
examine the divide between these audiences, and investigate how each shaped the way 
elected leaders communicated within the insular world of national politics.
58 Estes, ‘“ The Most Bewitching Piece of Parliamentary Oratory,”’ 21; Gustafson, 
Eloquence is Power, xiii, 241; Carolyn Eastman, ‘“ A Nation of Speechifiers’: Oratory, 
Print, and the Making of a Gendered American Public, 1780-1830” (Ph.D. Diss., The 
Johns Hopkins University, 2001), 28-29; Edward G. Parker, The Golden Age o f American 
Oratory (Boston: Whittemore, Niles, and Hall, 1857).
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